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RESTRUCTURE AND REFORM:
POST-BP DEEPWATER HORIZON
PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE
OVERSIGHT OF OFFSHORE
OIL AND GAS ACTIVITIES
LEILA MONROE *

I.

INTRODUCTION

The explosion of the BP Deepwater Horizon on April 20, 2010, and
the resulting catastrophic oil spill was not the first indication that federal
oversight of offshore oil and gas activities was not adequate. With eleven
people killed 1 and over 62,000 barrels of oil spilled per day, 2 this horrific
event captured the attention of the public and decisionmakers and
demanded immediate action to address the causes of the catastrophe. As
those causes were examined, however, it became clear that the
deficiencies in management, oversight, and response capabilities had

*
Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council. Ms. Monroe works on a range of issues,
including ocean governance, Coastal and Marine Spatial Planning, offshore oil and gas exploration
and extraction, siting of ocean renewable energy, marine protected areas, and ocean pollution,
particularly from land-based sources. Ms. Monroe received a Juris Doctor degree from Georgetown
University Law Center, and from Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service, she earned a Bachelor of
Science degree in Foreign Service with a focus on International Politics and Security Studies.
1
See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING,
FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: DEEP WATER, THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF
OFFSHORE DRILLING 55 (Jan. 2011), available at www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter REPORT OF
NAT’L COMM’N].
2
See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING,
STAFF WORKING PAPER NO. 3: THE AMOUNT AND FATE OF THE OIL 17 (Oct. 6, 2010, updated Jan.
11, 2011), available at www.oilspillcommission.gov/resources#staff-working-papers (follow “The
Amount and Fate of the Oil” link).
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been known, to some extent, for years. Prior to the accident on the BP
Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling rig, Congress, federal oversight
bodies, media, and other observers had documented the failures of the
U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI or “Department”), and its delegate,
the Minerals Management Service (MMS), to effectively regulate and
oversee lucrative Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) oil and gas activities.
Even before the well was capped on July 15, 2010 3 – and the nearly three
months of hydrocarbons gushing into the deep sea brought to an end –
the Obama Administration and DOI Secretary Salazar ordered a number
of investigations and reports to determine the causes of the accident and
produce recommendations to remedy significant oversight flaws.
This Article chronicles the multiple reviews that were conducted, in
an attempt to understand the flaws in government management and
oversight that allowed this disaster to occur. It endeavors to distill the
key recommendations produced by numerous reviewers related to
improving DOI’s management and oversight of offshore oil and gas
exploration and development activities. Although they are also critically
important topics, each with identified opportunities for improvement, it
is not within the scope of this Article to provide an in-depth discussion of
industry culture and practice, technological failures, oil spill response, or
spill restoration.
Part II of this Article discusses the troubled history of the Minerals
Management Service under the DOI. Part III reviews the chronology of
the BP Deepwater Horizon oversight structure reforms. Part IV examines
necessary changes to address past failures in government regulation and
oversight that contributed to the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster. With
regard to reforming government management and oversight, four areas of
change were identified by the multiple reports, investigations, and
recommendations produced by an array of government agencies, task
forces, panels, and experts examining the complex problems and
necessary reform with DOI, MMS, and the regulations they administer.
These multiple reviewers identified cross-cutting opportunities for deep,
lasting improvements to U.S. oversight of offshore oil and gas activities.
First, restructuring of DOI’s oversight agencies must create
institutional structures that provide a solid firewall against the inherent
conflict of interest between the Department’s revenue collection and
resource management – including environmental protection – duties.
Second, sufficient funding, staff, and technology must be available for
regulators to keep pace with one of the most high-tech, risky, and
3

See Campbell Robertson & Henry Fountain, BP Says Oil Flow Has Stopped as Cap Is
Tested, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/07/16/us/16spill.html.
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lucrative industries in the world. Third, DOI must work much more
closely with the federal natural resources and maritime safety agencies to
improve tough oversight, availability of science, efficiency and sharing
of resources. Fourth, the U.S. regulatory approach must be significantly
improved to better manage risk and keep pace with rapid industry
advances.
This Article also examines actions that have been taken, as of the
time of its writing (January 2011), by the Obama Administration and
Congress to implement recommendations to improve government
oversight of offshore oil and gas exploration and production. Some
changes to the federal oversight structure were made by the
Administration in the immediate wake of the spill, and other changes
were implemented after the completion of reviews and issuance of
recommendations. However, by the time the most comprehensive review
was released, the Final Report of the presidentially authorized National
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore
Drilling 4 (“National Commission”), Congress had yet to pass any form
of oil spill response bill, Administrative will to take bold and aggressive
steps was flagging, and industry was voraciously attacking the validity of
these well-supported recommendations for change. 5 Industry opponents
of change may succeed, as they have in the past, at halting any reforms
that would slow the pace or increase the costs of offshore oil and gas
exploration and production. 6

II.

TROUBLED HISTORY OF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR’S
MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE

The U.S. Department of the Interior and its delegate agency, the
Minerals Management Service, 7 had jurisdiction over 1.76 billion acres

4

See REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1.
See Press Release, Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Regulation and Enforcement, Director
Bromwich Discusses Strengthened Oversight of Offshore Oil and Gas Drilling and Development at
Gulf Oil Spill Series (Jan. 13, 2011), available at www.boemre.gov/ooc/press/2011/press0113.htm
(claiming that the major challenge facing the United States and the industry is how to dramatically
improve the safety of drilling, especially deepwater drilling, without negatively affecting the level of
operations or the number of people working).
6
See REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 71.
7
Later referred to as the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and
Enforcement. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3299, ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, THE BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL
ENFORCEMENT, AND THE OFFICE OF NATURAL RESOURCES REVENUE (May 19, 2010), available at
www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=32475 (revoking
5
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of the OCS and primary oversight for offshore oil and gas development
constituting “approximately thirty percent of domestically produced oil
and eleven percent of the domestic natural gas supply.” 8 Long before the
explosion of the BP Deepwater Horizon on April 20, the Obama
Administration, Secretary Salazar, and their predecessors were well
aware of major problems in government management and oversight of
offshore oil and gas activities. 9 MMS was established administratively
by Secretary of the Interior James Watt in 1982, and nearly from its
inception, it was impacted by industry influence and conflicts of
interest. 10 Examples of past problems included pressure from MMS
management to quickly process permit approvals and environmental
reviews; 11 failures to enforce safety and environmental requirements in
spite of substantial violations; 12 allowing industry self-regulation and
monitoring (such as incorporation of American Petroleum Institutewritten standards into offshore operating regulations); 13 flawed royalty
contracts that cost the government an estimated $6.4 and $9.8 billion in
the MMS’s duties and assigning them to two new bureaus and an office); see also U.S. DEP’T OF THE
INTERIOR, SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3302, CHANGE OF THE NAME OF THE MINERALS
MANAGEMENT SERVICE TO THE BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, REGULATION AND
ENFORCEMENT (June 18, 2010), available at www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/
loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=35872 (renaming the MMS as the Bureau of Ocean
Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement). This transitional structure has led to some
confusion; throughout this Article, each of the entities is referenced depending on the time of the
relevant action and which agency had authority at that time.
8
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT NO. X-SP-MOI0008-2010, INSPECTOR GENERAL’S STATEMENT SUMMARIZING THE MAJOR MANAGEMENT AND
PERFORMANCE CHALLENGES FACING THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 1 (Oct. 2010), available
at www.doioig.gov/images/stories/reports/pdf/X-SP-MOI-0008-2010%20
Performance%20Challenges.pdf. This report identified the “significant impediments to the
Department's efforts to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in its bureaus' management
and operations.” Id. OCS energy oversight is only one among eight categories of performance
challenges identified, which also include financial management, information technology security,
resource protection and restoration, and revenue collection. Id.
9
See Recent Departmental Actions to Improve Safety and Accountability on the Outer
Continental Shelf: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 111th Cong.
(2010) (statement of Ken Salazar, Sec’y of the Interior), available at www.boemre.gov/ooc/
PDFs/SalazarTestimony0609.pdf.
10
See CURRY L. HAGERTY & JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41262,
DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL: SELECTED ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 26 (July 30, 2010), available at
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41262.pdf.
11
See Juliet Eilperin, U.S. Oil Drilling Regulator Ignored Experts’ Red Flags on
Environmental Risks, WASH. POST, May 25, 2010, www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/05/24/AR2010052401974.html.
12
See Ian Urbina, BP Used Riskier Method to Seal Well Before Blast, N.Y. TIMES, May 26,
2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/05/27/us/27rig.html?hp=&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1274954539+YOt1W2Q4Ea5oPc/pOZtBw.
13
See REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 225.
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forgone revenues; 14 serious flaws in auditing of production reports and
royalty payments; 15 graft, malfeasance, and widespread corruption
among MMS personnel; 16 and a “revolving door” where employees
move between positions with industry and MMS. 17
After taking office, Secretary Salazar announced a program to
address the problems raised by the Government Accountability Office
and DOI Inspector General, addressing ethics standards, royalty policies
and program oversight issues raised to ensure a fair return to taxpayers,
and balancing the agency’s mission to include an aggressive offshore
renewable energy component. 18 Efforts to reform the agency between
2009 and the BP Deepwater Horizon accident included issuance of new
ethics guidelines and a new ethics code and program, elimination of the
Royalty-in-Kind program and disciplinary actions against employees
implicated in Inspector General investigations of that program, and
proposal of certain new rules on safety systems and audit requirements. 19
A number of the investigations, especially by the National
Commission, examined the iterative development of regulation. 20 This
history reveals striking patterns: periods of cozy industry-government
collaboration and rapid development have been interrupted by disasters,
which have led to a re-evaluation and adoption of stricter rules and

14

See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-682T, ROYALTIES COLLECTION:
ONGOING PROBLEMS WITH INTERIOR’S EFFORTS TO ENSURE A FAIR RETURN FOR TAXPAYERS
REQUIRE ATTENTION 6 (Mar. 28, 2007), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d07682t.pdf.
15
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-744, ROYALTY-IN-KIND PROGRAM:
MMS DOES NOT PROVIDE REASONABLE ASSURANCE IT RECEIVES ITS SHARES OF GAS, RESULTING
IN MILLIONS IN FORGONE REVENUE 10 (Aug. 2009), available at www.gao.gov/
new.items/d09744.pdf.
16
See Mark Clayton, US Rig Inspectors Received Gifts from Oil Companies, Report Says,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 25, 2010, www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0525/US-rig-inspectorsreceived-gifts-from-oil-companies-report-says; see also Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior,
Secretary of the Interior Salazar Asks IG to Investigate Whether Violations Persisted After
Implementation of New Ethics Rules in 2009 (May 25, 2010), available at
www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/IG-Report-MMS-Abuses-Yet-Another-Reason-to-CleanHouse.cfm.
17
See Frederic J. Frommer, Revolving Door Between BP and Its Regulator Getting More
Attention, HUFFINGTON POST, May 26, 2010, www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/26/bp-revolvingdoor-interior_n_591040.html?ref=email_share.
18
See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FACT SHEET: REFORMING MMS, JANUARY 2009PRESENT, available at www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/upload/05-07-10-reform-fact-sheet.pdf.
19
U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, News Release, Salazar Ends Controversial Royalty in Kind
Program, Launches Reforms to Management of Energy Resources on Public Lands, Outer
Continental Shelf (Sept. 16, 2009), available at fossil.energy.gov/programs/reserves/spr/
DOI_Release_-_Salazar_Ends_Controversial.pdf.
20
See REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1 at 68-76.
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regulations. 21 Industry then protests the heightened oversight and the
identified necessary changes are either ignored, deferred, or significantly
weakened. 22
III. CHRONOLOGY OF BP DEEPWATER HORIZON REVIEWS AND
OVERSIGHT STRUCTURE REFORMS
This Part reviews the government-initiated actions intended to
identify the root causes of the BP Deepwater Horizon accident. This
review focuses primarily on failures of government oversight and
recommendations for improving federal agency structure and oversight. 23
Ten days after the explosion of the BP Deepwater Horizon, on April
30, 2010, Secretary Salazar issued Order No. 3298 to establish the Outer
Continental Shelf Safety Oversight Board, with the purpose to “ensure a
timely, high-level review and implementation, as appropriate, of
recommendations to address the Department’s current and future
responsibility for management and administration of the OCS
program.” 24 The OCS Safety Oversight Board – composed of the
Assistant Secretaries for Policy, Management Budget and Land Minerals
Management and the Inspector General – was charged with providing
oversight, support, resources and recommendations to MMS regarding
the “Joint Investigation into the marine casualty, explosion, fire,
pollution, and sinking of mobile offshore drilling unit BP Deepwater
Horizon, with loss of life in the Gulf of Mexico, 21-22 April, 2010.” 25
21

Id.
Id. at 71.
23
For example, on May 14, 2010, the Council on Environmental Quality and the DOI
announced a review of the former MMS’s application of NEPA. CEQ, REPORT REGARDING THE
MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE’S NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT POLICIES,
PRACTICES, AND PROCEDURES AS THEY RELATE TO OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS
EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT (Aug. 16, 2010), available at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/microsites/ceq/20100816-ceq-mms-ocs-nepa.pdf. The National Academy of Engineering and
National Research Council also conducted a review of the blowout and ways to prevent such events.
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING/NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL (NAE/NRC) COMMITTEE,
ANALYSIS OF CAUSES OF THE DEEPWATER HORIZON EXPLOSION, FIRE, AND OIL SPILL TO IDENTIFY
MEASURES TO PREVENT SIMILAR ACCIDENTS IN THE FUTURE, INTERIM REPORT (Nov. 16, 2010),
www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/projectview.aspx?key=49246. The topics of those reviews are
beyond the scope of this Article.
24
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3298, ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF SAFETY OVERSIGHT BOARD (Apr. 30, 2010), available at
www.doi.gov/news/doinews/upload/Order-3298.pdf.
25
DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR & DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., JOINT DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR AND DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND
CONVENING ORDER REGARDING INVESTIGATION INTO THE MARINE CASUALTY, EXPLOSION, FIRE,
POLLUTION, AND SINKING OF MOBILE OFFSHORE DRILLING UNIT DEEPWATER HORIZON, WITH LOSS
22
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The Joint Investigation was conducted according to principles and a
convening order between DOI and the Department of Homeland
Security. The investigation was performed under the authority of the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) 26 , and in accordance with a
Memorandum of Agreement for conducting investigations. 27 Multiple
extensions were granted to the Joint Investigation Team; the report is
expected to be completed July 27, 2011. 28 The Joint Investigation is
focusing on operations, manning, maintenance and preparedness causes
and the responsibility for each held by the Operator (BP), drilling
contractor (Transocean), Flag State (RMI), and Coastal State
(MMS/USCG). 29
On April 30, 2010, the President also directed Secretary Salazar to
conduct a thorough review of this event and to report, within thirty days,
on what, if any, additional precautions and technologies should be
required to improve the safety of oil and gas exploration and production
operations on the OCS. 30 The report responding to that order was
produced on May 27, 2010. 31
On May 12, 2010, the Obama Administration submitted oil spill
response legislation to Congress “proposing to change the thirty-day
congressionally-mandated deadline to a 90-day timeline that can be
further extended to complete additional environmental and safety
reviews, as needed.” 32 This legislative proposal was designed to respond

LIFE IN THE GULF OF MEXICO, 21-22 APRIL 2010 (Apr. 27, 2010), available at
www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/upload/DHS-DOI-statemet_Deepwater-Horizon-investigaton.pdf.
26
43 U.S.C.A. § 1348 (Westlaw 2011).
27
See MINERALS MGMT. SERV. & U.S. COAST GUARD, MMS/USCG MOA: OCS-05,
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE – U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND THE U.S. COAST GUARD – U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.
(Mar. 27, 2009), available at www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/external/content/document/
3043/552571/1/USCG_MMS_MOA.pdf.
28
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior & U.S. Coast Guard, Deepwater Horizon
Joint Investigation Team Announces Extended Deadline for Final Report (Oct. 22, 2010), available
at www.deepwaterinvestigation.com (extension was requested to allow time for forensic testing and
public hearing based on that forensic evidence).
29
See U.S. COAST GUARD & BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION AND
ENFORCEMENT, JOINT USCG-BOEMRE INVESTIGATION ROADMAP, DETERMINING THE CAUSES OF
THE DEEPWATER HORIZON CASUALTY AND IMPROVING THE SAFETY NET FOR MODUS OPERATING
ON THE OCS (Aug. 3, 2010), available at www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/external/content/
document/3043/590203/1/JIT%20Deepwater%20Horizon%20Investigation%20Roadmap.pdf.
30
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Salazar Calls for New Safety Measures for
Offshore Oil and Gas Operations; Orders Six Month Moratorium on Deepwater Drilling (May 27,
2010), available at www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Calls-for-New-Safety-Measures-forOffshore-Oil-and-Gas-Operations-Orders-Six-Month-Moratorium-on-Deepwater-Drilling.cfm
31
Id.
32
Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Interior Issues Directive to Guide Safe, Six-Month
OF
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to MMS’s need for more time to review exploration plans. 33
The Administration acted very quickly in announcing the intent to
reform the agency with the primary responsibility for oversight off
offshore oil and gas, in response to the BP Deepwater Horizon
catastrophe. On May 19, 2010, Secretary Salazar issued Secretarial Order
3299 separating and reassigning the responsibilities previously
performed by MMS into two new bureaus and one new office, in an
effort to separate their potentially conflicting duties. 34 These offices are
the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), responsible for
resource evaluation, planning, and other activities related to leasing; the
Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), responsible
for creation of standards, inspections, and enforcement of safety and
environmental protection regulations; and the Office of Natural
Resources and Revenue (ONRR), responsible for the collection,
distribution, and management of revenue. The structure and
responsibilities of each of these entities was fleshed out over the course
of the following year, with ONRR receiving its direction and
responsibilities on October 1, 2010, BOEM and BSEE receiving more
detail on their mandates on January 19, 2011, and the details of the new
structure to be worked out through 2011. 35
President Obama announced on May 22, 2010, the creation of the
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and
Offshore Drilling (National Commission), “an independent, nonpartisan
entity, directed to provide a thorough analysis and impartial judgment.
The President charged the Commission to determine the causes of the
disaster, and to improve the country’s ability to respond to spills, and to
recommend reforms to make offshore energy production safer.” 36
The National Commission released its comprehensive report eight
months later, on January 12, 2011, and that report is discussed in detail in
Part IV below.
A few days after the creation of the National Commission, on May
27, 2010, Secretary Salazar submitted to the President a report
responding to the Executive request for identification of immediate,

Moratorium on Deepwater Drilling (May 30, 2010), available at www.doi.gov/news/
pressreleases/Interior-Issues-Directive-to-Guide-Safe-Six-Month-Moratorium-on-DeepwaterDrilling.cfm.
33
Id.
34
See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3299, supra note 7.
35
DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FACT SHEET: THE BSEE AND BOEM SEPARATION, AN
INDEPENDENT SAFETY, ENFORCEMENT AND OVERSIGHT MISSION (Jan. 19, 2011), available at
www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=119590.
36
REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at vi.
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short- and long-term measures that DOI should take to improve safety of
energy development on the OCS. The report recommended a number of
specific safety measures for blowout preventers and well control,
improvements that could be made to the culture of safety through
operational and personnel management, and “prescriptive near-term
requirements, longer-term performance-based safety measures, and one
or more Department-led working groups to evaluate longer-term safety
issues.” 37 Based on this report, Secretary Salazar determined that safety
required that deepwater drilling activities on new wells cease while
additional reviews were being conducted. Thus, on May 28 he issued a
memorandum ordering suspension of OCS drilling on new deepwater
wells, and two days later he released a Moratorium Notice to Lessees and
Operators (“Moratorium NTL”) 38 directing oil and gas lessees and
operators to cease drilling new deepwater wells, including wellbore
sidetrack and bypass activities; prohibiting the spudding of any new
deepwater wells; and putting oil and gas lessees and operators on notice
that, with certain exceptions, MMS will not consider for six months
drilling permits for deepwater wells and for related activities. For the
purposes of the Moratorium NTL, “deepwater” means depths greater
than 500 feet. 39
On June 18, 2010, Secretary Salazar issued Secretarial Order 3302
formally eliminating the former MMS and creating the Bureau of Ocean
Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE or
“Bureau”). 40 On June 23, 2010, DOI announced the creation of the
Investigations and Review Unit (IRU), which according to BOEMRE
Director Bromwich, “will provide us the capacity to investigate
allegations of misconduct, to provide unified and coordinated monitoring
of compliance with laws and regulations, and to respond swiftly to
37

U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, INCREASED SAFETY MEASURES FOR ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF, Exec. Summary (May 27, 2010), available at
www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=33598.
38
See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, NTL No. 2010-N04, NOTICE TO LESSEES AND
OPERATORS OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES IN THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF REGIONS OF
THE GULF OF MEXICO AND THE PACIFIC TO IMPLEMENT THE DIRECTIVE TO IMPOSE A MORATORIUM
ON ALL DRILLING OF DEEPWATER WELLS (May 30, 2010), available at
www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=33716. There was
some concern that the Executive Summary of U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 37, which
imposed the Moratorium, inappropriately described peer review conducted by the National Academy
of Engineering. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., INVESTIGATIVE
REPORT: FEDERAL MORATORIUM ON DEEPWATER DRILLING (Nov. 8, 2010), available at
www.doioig.gov/images/stories/reports/pdf/DeepwaterMoratoriumPublic.pdf.
39
Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 28; see also Hornbeck Offshore Servs. v. Salazar, 696 F.
Supp. 2d 627 (E.D. La. 2010) (industry challenge to the moratorium successful).
40
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3302, supra note 7.
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emerging and urgent issues on a Bureau-wide level and in the
industry.” 41 The IRU is intended to respond to possible misconduct and
unethical behavior by Bureau employees; pursue alleged misconduct by
oil and gas companies involved in offshore energy projects; quickly
respond to emerging issues and crises, including significant incidents
such as spills and accidents; and share information about misconduct or
crises with the DOI’s Office of Inspector General, then jointly determine
which office will conduct any investigation. 42
On July 14, 2010, DOI released an implementation report to
describe the status of the reorganization of the Minerals Management
Service. 43 This report provided some detail about the intended purpose of
each of the three departments that succeeded MMS. The report states that
the plan for implementation balances “the need for an expedited
transition with the extensive analysis and planning required to
successfully implement an organizational change of this scope and
complexity.” 44
On September 1, 2010, the OCS Safety Oversight Board produced a
report for Secretary Salazar, “providing recommendations to improve
and strengthen the Department’s overall management, regulation, and
oversight of OCS operations, including undertaking further audits or
reviews, and reviewing existing authorities and procedures.” 45 The
Oversight Board was an internal DOI review mechanism; it consisted of
the Assistant Secretary for Land and Minerals Management, the Interior
Department Inspector General, and the Assistant Secretary for Policy

41

Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Bromwich Launches Investigative/Compliance Team
to Spur Reform, Restructuring of Offshore Oil and Gas Regulation (June 23, 2010), available at
www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Bromwich-Launches-Investigative-Compliance-Team-to-SpurReform-Restructuring-of-Offshore-Oil-and-Gas-Regulation.cfm.
42
See Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Regulation and Enforcement, Investigations and
Review Unit, BOEMRE.GOV, www.boemre.gov/iru/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2011) (offering hotlines
for “[a]nyone with knowledge of misconduct or unethical behavior involving the Bureau” to submit
a report).
43
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, IMPLEMENTATION REPORT OF REORGANIZATION OF THE
MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE (July 14, 2010), available at www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/
loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=38543%20
[hereinafter
REORGANIZATION
IMPLEMENTATION REPORT]. In some DOI materials, this report is referred to as the Implementation
Plan, although this is distinct from the SAFETY OVERSIGHT REPORT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN cited
infra at note 47.
44
Id. at 6.
45
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF SAFETY OVERSIGHT BD.,
REPORT TO SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR KEN SALAZAR 1 (Sep. 1, 2010), available at
www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=43677
[hereinafter OCS SAFETY OVERSIGHT REPORT].
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Management and Budget. 46
On September 4, 2010, Director Bromwich submitted to Secretary
Salazar the Implementation Plan of Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management, Regulation and Enforcement in response to the Report of
the OCS Safety Oversight Board. Director Bromwich explained to
Secretary Salazar that the Implementation Plan contains information
about how most of the recommendations in the OCS Safety Oversight
Board Report were already being addressed by the reorganization of the
agencies. 47 Given that a number of in-depth investigations were still
months away from releasing their recommendations, this stated approach
calls into question the extent to which BOEMRE was really willing to go
to eradicate the deepest flaws in government oversight.
In a move to separate revenue collection activities from the mineral
leasing and regulatory functions on October 1, 2010, the Office of
Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR) authority over revenue collection
functions was officially transferred from BOEMRE to the Assistant
Secretary for Policy Management and Budget. 48 ONRR was given duties
for management of:
[R]evenues from Federal and Indian onshore and offshore mineral and
energy resource leases, and other mineral and energy resource
development arrangements and activities not subject to the mining
laws, to assure full and timely collection, distribution, and
disbursement of bonuses, rentals, royalties, and other revenues and
coordination of related Departmental policy. 49

The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and
Enforcement created eleven Implementation Teams to direct the process
of reforming the agencies. 50 According to Director Bromwich, the teams
46

Id.
See MICHAEL R. BROMWICH, DIR., BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION
AND ENFORCEMENT, IMPLEMENTATION PLAN IN RESPONSE TO THE OCS SAFETY OVERSIGHT
BOARD’S SEPTEMBER 1, 2010 REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, intro. letter 6 (Sep. 4,
2010), available at www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/
getfile&PageID=43879 [hereinafter SAFETY OVERSIGHT REPORT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN].
48
See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3306, ORGANIZATIONAL
CHANGES UNDER THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY – POLICY, MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET (Sep. 30,
2010), available at www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/
getfile&PageID=46102; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Interior Establishes Office
of Natural Resources Revenue (Oct. 1, 2010), available at www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/InteriorEstablishes-Office-of-Natural-Resources-Revenue.cfm.
49
See id.
50
See Bureau of Ocean Energy Management Plans for Regulating Oil Drilling: Hearing
Before the National Comm. on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement
47
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considered the recommendations for improvement received from sources
including the report and conversations with the National Oil Spill
Commission, the report of the National Academy of Engineering, and the
report of the Safety Oversight Board commissioned by Secretary
Salazar. 51
Throughout the fall and winter of 2010, the staff of the National
Commission released a number of reports, and the National Commission
released its final report on January 11, 2011. The report included many
recommended changes to Federal laws, regulations, and oversight
structure discussed in more detail below. The National Commission also
made recommendations to address industry practices and other aspects of
oil spill response not explored in this Article.
IV. NECESSARY CHANGES TO ADDRESS FAILURES IN GOVERNMENT
REGULATION AND OVERSIGHT CONTRIBUTING TO THE BP
DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTER
The blowout was not the product of a series of aberrational decisions
made by rogue industry or government officials that could not have
been anticipated or expected to occur again. Rather, the root causes
are systemic and, absent significant reform in both industry practices
and government policies, might well recur. The missteps were rooted
in systemic failures by industry management (extending beyond BP to
contractors that serve many in the industry), and also by failures of
government to provide effective regulatory oversight of offshore
52
drilling.

This Part reviews those failures of government oversight identified
by the multiple bodies and experts that investigated the causes of the BP
Deepwater Horizon tragedy. Some other problems underlying that
catastrophe, such as industry culture and practice or flaws in oil spill
response preparedness and technology, are beyond the scope of this
Article.
Various reviews of the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster produced
dozens of specific recommendations for improving management and
of Michael Bromwich, Director, BOEMRE); see also Press Release, Bureau of Ocean Energy
Mgmt., Regulation and Enforcement, BOEMRE Director Testifies Before the National Commission
on the DP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (Nov. 9, 2010), available at
www.boemre.gov/ooc/press/2010/press1109.htm.
51
See Press Release, Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Regulation and Enforcement, supra
note 5.
52
REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 122.
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oversight of U.S. offshore oil and gas exploration and production. This
Article discusses four general recommendations that are cross-cutting
and identified by multiple reviewers as being necessary for deep, lasting
improvements to U.S. oversight of offshore oil and gas activities: (1)
restructuring of DOI’s oversight agencies must eliminate the inherent
conflict of interest between revenue collection and oversight activities;
(2) sufficient funding, staff, and technology must be available for
regulators to keep pace with industry; (3) agencies must work together to
improve tough oversight, availability of science, efficiency and sharing
of resources; and (4) the U.S. regulatory approach must be improved to
better manage risk and keep pace with rapid industry advances.
These are not the only recommendations identified by the various
commissions, reviews, and experts consulted, and this analysis does not
provide significant detail about the reforms proposed. This Article
attempts to synthesize those recommendations that appeared most
frequently and appear to be the greatest priority with regard to improving
government oversight of offshore oil and gas activities.
A.

CONFLICTING AGENCY MANDATES NECESSITATE SIGNIFICANT
RESTRUCTURING, TOUGH FIREWALLS, AND EXTERNAL REVIEW

The 1978 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments
(OCSLA) gave DOI and its delegate, the Minerals Management Service,
four distinct – and often conflicting – responsibilities: to manage
offshore leasing, to collect revenue and conduct auditing, to ensure
appropriate permitting and operational safety, and to protect the natural
resources on the OCS. 53 Each of these responsibilities requires different
skill sets and cultures, and since its creation, MMS has been torn in two
conflicting directions by these competing mandates. 54
The revenue generated from energy activities on the OCS is
tremendously important to the federal government, so it is easy to
understand how the pressure to issue leases quickly and in large numbers
would outweigh careful environmental review and strict oversight of
53

See Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978); see also
REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 67.
54
See REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 56 (“The origins of MMS vividly
illustrate that political compromise. Secretary of the Interior James Watt created the agency with
great fanfare in January 1982, aiming from the outset to promote domestic energy supplies by
dramatically expanding drilling on the OCS. He combined, in one entity, authority for regulatory
oversight with responsibility for collecting for the U.S. Treasury the billions of dollars of revenues
obtained from lease sales and royalty payments from producing wells. From birth, MMS had a builtin incentive to promote offshore drilling in sharp tension with its mandate to ensure safe drilling and
environmental protection.”).
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agency activities:
Since 1953, the Federal Government has received approximately $200
billion in lease bonuses, fees, and royalty payments from OCS oil and
gas operators. Last year, the Federal OCS leasing revenue was $6
billion. The OCS oil and gas industry provides relatively high-paying
jobs in drilling and production activities, as well as employment in
supporting industries. Offshore operations provide direct employment
estimated at 150,000 jobs. 55

Close ties between MMS and industry resulted in many instances of
the oversight agency giving the industry significant discounts, or
shortchanging taxpayers, for the extraction of public resources. 56 This
pervasive problem is identified by the National Commission as occurring
from the very first years of the MMS leasing program. 57 MMS’s practice
of opening large areas of the OCS to be leased had the effect of reducing
rents received for leases: “Secretary Watt’s plans for accelerated leasing
would cost the U.S. Treasury $77 billion over the five-year period.” 58
The conflicting mandates require fundamental reforms “in both the
structure of those in charge of regulatory oversight and their internal
decision-making process to ensure their political autonomy, technical
expertise, and their full consideration of environmental protection
concerns.” 59 A number of recommendations emerged to address this
tension within the Minerals Management Service, and its successor
agencies, BOEM, BSEE, and ONRR.
In the wake of the BP Deepwater Horizon explosion, the
Administration acknowledged that MMS suffered from conflicts between
its resource management, safety and environmental oversight and
enforcement, and revenue collection mandates. 60 Thus, the Department
moved quickly to reassign these responsibilities into three new entities
within DOI. While this reorganization was a step in the right direction,
reviewers expressed concern that it “does not adequately address the

55

U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 37, at 4 (referencing Minerals Management
Service Database 2010).
56
See Jason DeParle, Minerals Service Had a Mandate to Produce Results, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 7, 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/08/08/us/08mms.html; see also Elliott A. Norse & John
Amos, Impacts, Perception, and Policy Implications of the Deepwater Horizon Oil and Gas
Disaster, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 11058, 11070 (2010).
57
REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 65 (quoting the Sierra Club’s estimates in
Interior Denies Oil Leasing Plan Will Cost $77 Billion, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sep. 28, 1982).
58
Id.
59
Id. at vii.
60
See REORGANIZATION IMPLEMENTATION REPORT, supra note 43, at 2.
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deeper problem of fully insulating the Department’s safety and
environmental protection functions from the pressures to increase
production and maximize lease revenues.” 61 Although the restructuring
included the creation of a Chief Environmental Officer position, the new
structure maintains within the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management
(BOEM) both the authority to issue leases and to perform environmental
review and planning decisions. 62
B.

REMEDY MMS LACK OF SUFFICIENT FUNDING, STAFF, AND
TECHNICAL RESOURCES

A cross-cutting theme identified in various reviews was that the lack
of sufficient funding or staff with the right training, education,
management commitment, motivation and technical resources (laptops)
significantly undermined the ability of DOI to provide effective
management and oversight. Lack of funding and sufficient resources was
identified by multiple reviewers as the cause of numerous problems,
including inability to recruit and retain the best staff, vulnerability of
staff to industry capture, and inability of staff to keep up with the
workload. Reviews conducted by both the OCS Safety Oversight Board
and the National Commission identified the dramatic increase in
workload without a commensurate increase in MMS resources as a
significant problem. 63
The OCS Safety Oversight Board identified lack of sufficient
funding and staffing, and the need for more personnel and training,
education, and professional growth and development opportunities for
them as significant problems undermining federal oversight of OCS
energy extraction activities. 64 The National Commission called the
situation “safety regulation on a starvation diet” 65 and noted that MMS
would “increasingly struggle to keep up with the pace of industry
expansion, while juggling four distinct responsibilities – offshore leasing,
revenue collection and auditing, permitting and operational safety, and
environmental protection – requiring different skill sets and cultures.” 66

61

REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 255.
See Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 28.
63
See OCS SAFETY OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 45, at 6; see also REPORT OF NAT’L
COMM’N, supra note 1, at 72, 256-57.
64
See OCS SAFETY OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 45, at 4-5.
65
REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 72.
66
Id. at 67 (“The root problem has instead been that political leaders within both the
Executive Branch and Congress have failed to ensure that agency regulators have had the resources
necessary to exercise that authority, including personnel and technical expertise, and, no less
62
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Without sufficient funding, the regulators were not able to keep pace
with technological and industry advancements.
In one of his multiple testimonies to the National Commission,
Director Bromwich explained the work the agency was doing to achieve
reform:
We are also taking steps to secure additional funding and resources for
BOEMRE and its successor agencies. . . . Central to this effort is
encouraging congressional approval of additional funding and
resources for BOEMRE and its successor agencies as we implement
the reorganization. The Administration recently submitted a FY 2011
Budget Amendment requesting a $100 million increase for BOEMRE
operations funding to facilitate reorganization and reform of the
agency. 67

Implementation of many of the identified recommendations and
pledged reform is primarily dependent on the availability of additional
resources, specifically funding and personnel. 68
Despite the importance of securing sustained and sufficient funding
for federal oversight activities, there has been fierce political opposition
to attempts to increase agency funding. A proposal, consistent with the
recommendations of the National Commission, 69 to raise fees on oil and
gas operators to better cover the costs of hiring new rig inspectors,
conducting scientific research, and finalizing the reform of the oversight
agency was criticized strongly by Republican lawmakers and the
industry. These critiques claimed the fees would drive offshore oil and
gas operations overseas. 70

important, the political autonomy needed to overcome the powerful commercial interests that have
opposed more stringent safety regulation.”).
67
Press Release, Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Regulation and Enforcement, supra note 5
(BOEMRE provided “staff with nearly one thousand documents, totaling over 15,000 pages, and
approximately 30 interviews, briefings and meetings detailing the Bureau’s historical functions and
programs.”).
68
E.g., SAFETY OVERSIGHT REPORT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 47, at 12 (“These
recommendations are directly tied to the infusion of additional resources into the Bureaus safety and
enforcement program, including the hiring and distribution of new personnel and enhancements to
the Bureau’s information technology infrastructure.”).
69
REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1 at 256-57.
70
See Phil Taylor, Battle Brews over Interior Bid to Increase Regulatory Fees for Offshore
Drilling Projects, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2011, www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/01/21/21greenwirebattle-brews-over-interior-bid-to-increase-reg-81926.html.
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IMPROVE CONTENT AND UNIFORM APPLICATION OF REGULATIONS
AND ENFORCEMENT

The development of offshore oil and gas management and oversight
structures has been iterative; major accidents have resulted in staged
reforms and improvement of regulations and oversight. Industry and
government have a long history of working very closely together to
advance drilling: reforms proposed in the wake of a disaster were
frequently not fully realized. Government incentives have enabled the
expansion of development deeper and deeper, and the industry has
continued to expand and grow. 71
Just over a month after the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster,
Secretary Salazar fulfilled President Obama’s April 30, 2010, request for
a thirty-day review of additional precautions and technologies that could
improve the safety of OCS oil and gas exploration and production. Even
while the well was still gushing, and the causes of disaster were still
being investigated, DOI identified numerous necessary improvements to
enhance enforcement of current regulations; improve safety management
systems, procedures, and operations; and institute new rules requiring a
comprehensive, systems-based approach to safety and environmental
management. 72 The extent of the problems identified and changes needed
were so significant that Secretary Salazar called for a six-month
moratorium on new permits and drilling activities in the OCS. 73
i.

U.S. Regulations Need Significant and Ongoing Improvement

As more information was gathered and additional reviews
conducted, the extent to which regulations have not kept pace with
technological advances was brought into sharp relief. J. Robinson West,
former Assistant Secretary of the Interior and current industry consultant,
stated in testimony to the National Commission, “[T]he fundamental
challenge all regulators face is the potential mismatch between very
dynamic business processes and static regulatory systems.” 74
Analysis of the flaws with the U.S. system led to consideration of
offshore oil and gas in regulation and reforms in other nations around the
71

See REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 68-72.
See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 37.
73
Id.
74
History and Expansion of Offshore Drilling: Hearing Before the National Comm. on the
BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 111th Cong. 5 (2010) (statement of J.
Robinson West), available at www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Robinson%20West%20Written%20Statement.pdf.
72
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world. 75 Numerous post-BP Deepwater Horizon reviewers discussed the
differences between the U.S. regulatory system and the approaches
applied in the United Kingdom and Norway, which have moved away
from a prescriptive regulatory approach to a performance-based
approach. 76 Regulatory systems are typically categorized as falling into
one of three groups: (1) prescriptive, applied in the United States and
focusing on detailed regulations and requirements; (2) self-regulation, in
nations, such as Angola, that lack capacity or will to substantially
oversee industry; and (3) performance-based or “safety case” approaches
that focus on a flexible, yet arguably more effective, risk management
structure, such as those in the United Kingdom, Norway, Australia and
Canada. 77
Secretary Salazar acknowledged the need to adopt a safety case
approach, based on the guidelines applied by the International
Association of Drilling Contractors, that would “establish risk
assessment and mitigation processes to manage a drilling contractor’s
controls related to the health, safety, and environmental aspects of their
operations,” and to finalize a Safety and Environmental Management
System for offshore drilling operations. 78 At first glance, this was a
demonstration of meaningful commitment to reforms, but the Report of
the National Commission reveals that the Norwegian, British and
Canadian governments adopted such an approach in the early 1990s, and
MMS had been instructed by the Marine Board of the National Research
Council of the need to conduct such a regulatory overhaul.79 “At the time
of the Macondo blowout—almost 20 years after its original proposal—
MMS had still not published a rule mandating that all operators have
plans to manage safety and environmental risks.” 80
The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and
Enforcement has demonstrated resolve to implement a number of safety
and environmental measures. 81 These include the Drilling Safety Rule,
75

See REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 69 -71.
See Christopher F. Richardson, The Influence of Offshore Leasing Regimes on Commercial
Oil Activity: An Empirical Analysis of Property Rights in the Gulf of Mexico and the North Sea, 17
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 97, 103-04, (2004); see also U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note
37, at 10.
77
Statement of J. Robinson West, supra note 74. Comparisons of regulatory approaches in
Norway, United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada are also available in U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
supra note 37, at 15-16, and REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 68-72.
78
See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 37, at 27-28.
79
See REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 69-71.
80
Id. at 71.
81
See Press Release, Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Regulation and Enforcement, supra
note 5.
76
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containing new standards for well design; casing and cementing and
requiring operators to obtain independent third-party inspection and
certification of each stage of the proposed drilling process; and the
Workplace Safety Rule, which requires operators to develop a
comprehensive safety and environmental management program that
identifies the potential hazards and risk-reduction strategies for all phases
of activity, from well design and construction, to operation and
maintenance, and finally to the decommissioning of platforms. 82
BOEMRE also issued new Notices to Lessees (NTL): NTL-06, which
requires that operators’ oil spill response plans include a well-specific
blowout and worst-case discharge scenario and that operators also
provide the assumptions and calculations behind these scenarios; 83 and
NTL-10, which establishes informational requirements, including a
corporate statement from the operator that it will conduct the applied-for
drilling operation in compliance with all applicable agency regulations,
including the new Drilling Safety Rule. 84
Although these are improvements over the pre-BP Deepwater
Horizon requirements, the new regulations and rules are still based on
American Petroleum Institute (API) practice. For example, according to
the National Commission, the Workplace Safety Rule—based on the
Safety and Environmental Management Program Recommended Practice
75 developed in 1993 by the API and incorporated by reference into the
rule—needs updating immediately to be sufficient. 85
Even these modest measures have faced fierce industry opposition.
For example, media reported that offshore oil and gas industry groups
have expressed strong opposition to the changes, bombarding DOI and
the Administration with critiques. 86 In two weeks in January 2011,
industry representatives met with Director Bromwich and his staff in
Washington, D.C., to strongly express their concern about delays to new

82

See Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf – Safety and
Environmental Management Systems, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,610 (Oct.15, 2010).
83
See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT, NTL NO.
2010-N06, INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR EXPLORATION PLANS, DEVELOPMENT AND
PRODUCTION PLANS, AND DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS COORDINATION DOCUMENTS ON THE OCS
(June 18, 2010), available at gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/regulate/regs/ntls/2010NTLs/10-n06.pdf.
84
See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT, NTL NO.
2010-N10, STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE REGULATIONS AND EVALUATION OF
INFORMATION DEMONSTRATING ADEQUATE SPILL RESPONSE AND WELL CONTAINMENT
RESOURCES (Nov. 8, 2010), available at gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/regulate/regs/ntls/2010NTLs/10n10.pdf.
85
See REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 242.
86
See Leslie Turk, Angelle Back in DC on Permit Issue, INDEP. WKLY., Jan. 28, 2011,
www.theind.com/news/7693-angelle-back-in-dc-on-permit-issue.
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permitting that might be caused by the new rules. 87
ii.

New Rules Must Also Be Meaningfully Enforced

New rules and regulations will not have their intended effect
without tough, persistent and uniform enforcement. The review
conducted by the OCS Safety and Oversight Board found numerous
problems that have undermined the effectiveness of enforcement. In
particular, civil penalties, capped at $35,000 per violation, 88 are far lower
than necessary to serve as an effective deterrent for an industry that pays
between $500,000 and $1 million per day to run a facility. 89
Furthermore, the vast majority of “Incidents of Noncompliance” (INC)
that are issued do not result in civil penalties or meaningful follow-up.
Of the 2,298 INCs issued in 2009, only eighty-seven were referred to the
civil penalty process, a total of $919,000 in civil penalties were collected,
and only fifty follow-up inspections were conducted. 90 Finally, lack of
whistleblower protections has been a significant problem. 91
The OCS Safety and Oversight Board identified numerous
disparities between oversight offices and regions. Differences include
different protocols, program structures, and capacity between the Pacific
Region, Gulf of Mexico Region and Alaska Region. 92 Disparities also
exist between the district offices within a single region, with the result
that operators “shop around” for approval. 93 MMS’s past malfeasance
often occurred at the field office level. All reforms must be designed to
affect all levels of the restructured agency.
Additionally, it is important to improve coordination between
Washington and field offices and to ensure that reforms permeate
vertically through the new regulatory structure. One step to achieve this
would be to issue a binding directive similar to the Bureau of Land
Management’s (BLM) recently instituted policy that requires the field
offices to form Interdisciplinary Consistency Review Teams for lands in
their jurisdictions and to report to the Washington office to ensure
leasing decisions appropriately consider environmental factors and

87
88

Id.
See 43 U.S.C.A. § 1350(b) (Westlaw 2011); see also 30 C.F.R §§ 250.200-.206 (Westlaw

2011).
89

OCS SAFETY OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 45, at 18.
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 8-9.
93
Id. at 6.
90
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public input. 94 In August 2010, BOEMRE took a step in the right
direction to improve the explicit code of conduct for all employees, by
issuing new guidance to strengthen recusal for conflict of interest, reduce
cronyism, and improve reporting industry attempts to influence or coerce
agency action. 95
D.

INCREASE PARTICIPATION AND OVERSIGHT FROM EXTERNAL
AGENCIES

Although DOI interacts with multiple federal agencies in overseeing
offshore energy activities, interagency consultation requirements are
weak or very narrow. There is limited onus on BOEMRE to accept the
input or expertise of natural resource agencies in planning, leasing and
permitting under OCSLA. 96 The National Commission identified the
“need for greater interagency consultation” as a key recommendation to
better safeguard the environment. 97 The need for this change was also
expressed by multiple experts who testified or provided written comment
to the Commission. 98 Improving substantive, and in some instances
binding, interagency consultation is likely to have positive effects on the
offshore oil and gas oversight regime, including improving the
identification of the areas where oil and gas operations are acceptable
and those “that should be excluded from lease sales because of their high
ecological importance or sensitivity;” 99 ensuring external review of

94

See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., OIL AND GAS LEASING REFORM – LAND USE PLANNING
(May 17, 2010), available at www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/info/
regulations/Instruction_Memos_and_Bulletins/national_instruction/2010/IM_2010-117.html (BLM
instruction memorandum from Director to all field offices).
95
See MICHAEL R. BROMWICH, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION AND
ENFORCEMENT, POLICY REGARDING INTERFERENCE WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES
AND
POTENTIAL
CONFLICTS
OF
INTEREST
(Aug.
30,
2010),
available
at
www.boemre.gov/PDFs/Recusalmemo0830.pdf.
96
This Article does not focus on numerous other opportunities to improve OCSLA, for
example, by requiring more comprehensive and effective environmental review of planning and
leasing decisions. Existing Regulatory Structure & Consulting Agency Roles: Statutory Framework
and Interagency Consultation & Planning: Hearing Before the National Comm. on the B.P.
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Margaret R.
Caldwell), available at www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
MargaretCaldwellWrittenStatement.pdf; see also Memorandum from Jody Freeman, Harvard Law
School, to Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Structural
Options for Improving MMS/BOEM Decision Making on Offshore Drilling (Oct. 13, 2010),
available at www.scribd.com/doc/40642315/Jody-Freeman-Presentation-on-Structural-Options-forMMS-BOEM.
97
See REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 262-63.
98
Id.
99
Id.
AND LEASE PARCEL REVIEWS
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agency decisions, which will help balance consideration of DOI’s
multiple mandates (i.e., environmental protection versus revenue
maximization); improving resource sharing; enhancing exchange of
scientific information; and saving money or increasing efficiency
through cost and staff sharing. 100
There are consultation requirements throughout the multi-staged
OCSLA leasing program. The Secretary of the Interior “shall invite and
consider suggestions for such program from any interested Federal
agency, including the Attorney General, in consultation with the Federal
Trade Commission, and from the Governor of any State which may
become an affected State under such proposed program.” 101 Although the
Secretary must reply to the state’s requests “in writing, granting or
denying such request in whole or in part,” and must similarly respond to
the Attorney General on comments regarding anti-trust matters, there is
no obligation for other agencies to comment or for DOI to respond or
incorporate comments received. 102
Consultation requirements of other environmental statutes
(including the Clean Air Act and the Endangered Species Act) also
require BOEMRE to confer with federal agencies charged with marine
resource protection: the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS),
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), and U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), all of which possess significant scientific data
and expertise on ecosystems and wildlife in the OCS. 103
The OCS Safety Oversight Panel identified the need for better
resource sharing between BOEMRE and the other agencies: “In addition
to its own legal mandates, BOEMRE conducts inspections for the EPA
on air quality and point-source discharges, for the USCG on safety, and
for the Department of Transportation on pipelines – all without
reimbursement.” 104 BOEMRE also shares responsibility for oversight of
offshore oil and gas activities with the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), which
has oversight responsibility for the safety of systems at the platform level
of mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU), while BOEMRE oversees subplatform drilling systems. 105 Despite a 2004 Memorandum of
100

Statement of Margaret R. Caldwell, supra note 96; see also Memorandum from Jody
Freeman, supra note 96.
101
43 U.S.C.A. § 1344(c)(1) (Westlaw 2011).
102
43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1337(c)(2), (d)(2) (Westlaw 2011).
103
See Memorandum from Jody Freeman, supra note 96.
104
OCS SAFETY OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 45, at 13.
105
See 43 U.S.C.A. § 1337(p) (Westlaw 2011); see also HAGERTY & RAMSEUR, supra note
10, at 13.
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Understanding between MMS and the USCG “to promote interagency
consistency in the regulation of OCS activities and facilities under the
jurisdiction” of both agencies, 106 better coordination is also necessary in
order to facilitate unannounced inspections. 107
To achieve improved interagency coordination, the National
Commission and other experts recommended the OCSLA be amended to
designate NOAA, which has science and marine resource expertise and
responsibilities, as a cooperating agency for the purposes of National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) compliance under OCSLA. 108
Improvements could also be made by clarifying and strengthening
interagency consultation with NOAA, EPA, NMFS, and USFWS,
requiring that BOEMRE consult with these agencies and respond to input
in writing. 109
An augmented role for other natural resources agencies and
independent science entities will help ensure development of regulations
and enable their implementation and enforcement to be robust and free
from industry influence. In particular, NOAA, as the lead federal agency
with knowledge and jurisdiction over coastal and marine ecosystems,
should be given a much stronger role in preparation of Environmental
Impact Statement and related NEPA documents, even beyond the status
of a co-operating agency. 110 Congress could also consider amending the
OCSLA to accord NOAA further deference, particularly at the planning
and leasing stages of OCS review.
To improve external oversight of all aspects of offshore oil and gas
oversight, periodic reviews should also conducted by external entities,
such as the National Academies of Sciences and Engineering. 111
Additional oversight by agencies outside of DOI might also be pursued
for the development of certain standards and regulations. For example,
106

MINERALS MGMT. SERV. & U.S. COAST GUARD, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN THE MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE – U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND THE
U.S. COAST GUARD – U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Sep. 30, 2004), available at
www.boemre.gov/regcompliance/MOU/cgmoufnl.htm. This MOU was entered into under the
authority of 14 U.S.C.A. § 141 (Westlaw 2011) (Coast Guard cooperation with other agencies);
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), as amended, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1347, 1348(a) (Westlaw
2011); Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2712 (a)(5)(A) (Westlaw 2011); and
Submerged Lands Act (SLA), as amended, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1315 (Westlaw 2011).
107
OCS SAFETY OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 45, at 9 (conducting a survey of 400
BOEMRE employees, finding that 90% of inspectors responding to the survey identified a critical
need for more unannounced inspections, which were rarely performed because of the requirements
of the Coast Guard to satisfy its Maritime Security Plan).
108
See REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 264.
109
See Statement of Margaret R. Caldwell, supra note 96.
110
See REPORT OF NAT’L COMM’N, supra note 1, at 264.
111
Id.
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the development of new safety standards and regulations could be
advised or reviewed by the National Academy of Engineering, which the
President has tasked with conducting an independent, technical
investigation to determine the root mechanical and technical causes of
the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster. 112
V.

CONCLUSION

In the wake of the BP Deepwater Horizon catastrophe, tremendous
effort has been dedicated by external and government experts to
determining the failings in management and oversight that allowed the
accident to occur. Various reviews made clear that deep and systemic
problems with the federal oversight structure were contributing causes
and that there are clear opportunities to make permanent, lasting
improvements to address these problems. Identification of necessary
reforms is only the first step to reforming management and oversight of
U.S. offshore oil and gas exploration and production. Now, sustained
commitment is needed from both the Administration and Congress to
ensure that these reforms are meaningfully implemented. There is
indication that industry and political forces are endeavoring to undermine
such implementation.
The Obama Administration has taken significant steps to address
problems with government oversight, but this action must be sustained
and supported by funding and legislative action from Congress. In
August 2010, the U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R. 3534, the
CLEAR Act, which sought to implement many of the reforms that were
identified by the National Commission and many expert reviewers that
have been analyzed in this Article. 113 Those included codification of
MMS restructuring, with the creation of an independent science office to
conduct NEPA reviews; amendments to OCSLA that would have
required enhanced consultation with NOAA; establishment of stronger
safety standards; and numerous other provisions that would have
addressed oil spill liability and funding for restoration and numerous
other deficiencies not covered by this Article. There was insufficient
Senate support to pass the bill out of Congress. Since release of the Final
Report in January 2011, members of the National Commission have
112

See NAT’L ACAD. OF ENG’G AND NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS.,
INTERIM REPORT ON CAUSES OF THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL RIG BLOWOUT AND WAYS TO
PREVENT SUCH EVENTS (Nov. 16 2010), available at www.nationalacademies.org/includes/
DH_Interim_Report_final.pdf.
113
See Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources Act of 2009, H.R. 3534, 111th
Cong. § 101 (2009).
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testified before Congress to explicitly request legislative action to
implement recommendations of the report, but a highly contentious
political climate will make passage of such legislation very
challenging. 114

114

See Prepared Joint Testimony for Commission Co-Chairs Bob Graham and William
Reilly: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 112th Cong. (2011)
(statement of Bob Graham and William Reilly, Co-Chairs, Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling), available at www.oilspillcommission.gov/page/preparedjoint-testimony-commission-co-chairs-bob-graham-and-william-reilly-senate-committee-en.
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